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‘A different view would be that sovereignty and sovereign states, and the inexorable 
linkage of law with sovereignty and the state, have been but the passing phenomena of a 
few centuries, that their passing is by no means regrettable, and that current 
developments in Europe exhibit the possibility of going beyond all that. On this view, 
our passing beyond the sovereign state is to be considered a good thing, an entirely 
welcome development in the history of legal and political ideas.’(1) 
Introduction 
It is with this passage that Neil MacCormick started his now famous 1992 Chorley Lecture which 
was later published under the title Beyond the Sovereign State. He was then one of the first Anglo-
American legal philosophers to analyse the legal and political nature of the European Union (EU) 
and to venture the possibility of doing so without the concept of legal and political sovereignty 
altogether.  
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2His concept of post-sovereignty has gradually become very influential in Europe(2) and has recently 
led many authors to compete in finding the right vocabulary to pinpoint the very specificity of the 
shift in sovereignty which has characterized European politics over the years.(3) Sovereignty is 
clearly en vogue and even more so since constitutional talk has made its way to the European front 
stage, thus raising the spectre of European unitary sovereignty, on the one hand, and hence of 
renewed threats to national sovereignty, on the other. In fact, never has sovereignty been as 
fashionable as since its explanatory and normative force first came into doubt and its knell was tolled 
in the European Union. What makes sovereignty such a contestable concept is its very paradox: the 
high degree and diversity of criticism raised against state sovereignty for the past fifty years both in 
practice and theory, on the one hand, and its remarkable resilience in post-national(4) political debate 
and legal discourse, on the other. As Neil Walker rightly observes in his recent book Sovereignty in 
Transition, ‘the idea of sovereignty cannot just be wished away. […] It is the very challenge to the 
old order that demands such urgent re-examination of the building blocks of that order ’.(5) 
This concern for the future of sovereignty is not new, however, and goes beyond the question of the 
political nature of the European Union.(6) For a long time the concept or principle(7) of (state) 
sovereignty was regarded as the cornerstone of both national and international political and legal 
organization, on the one hand, and of modern political thought, on the other;(8) it was the state’s 
‘normal’ condition(9) to be the supreme power or ultimate authority in political and legal matters, 
whether internally or externally. The precursor of the current ‘international community(10) ’ 
resembled a ‘society’ of equal and independent states sovereign both on the outside and the inside.
(11) In fact, not only was sovereignty regarded as a norm, but its content itself was perceived as self-
evident and applicable to all matters of daily governance.(12) Of course, sovereignty has always 
been limited.(13) For a long time, however, these limitations have been regarded as inherent to the 
concept of sovereignty and as jeopardizing neither its function nor its justification.(14)  
Recently, however, sovereignty has been subject to growing challenges both in theory and in 
practice. Over the last fifty years or so, lawyers, political theorists and specialists of international 
relations have become more and more divided on the issue of state sovereignty and sovereignty in 
general. The international community’s power has been constantly reinforced to the detriment of 
state sovereignty; this has happened through power transfers from states to international or 
supranational organisations such as the EU(15) , the development of ius cogens(16) and of the 
international community’s ‘constitution’(17) , the reinforcement of the principle of humanitarian 
intervention, the emergence of the concept of ‘failed state’, economic or legal globalization and, 
finally, the development of new international and transnational actors such as NGOs or multinational 
corporations.(18) Conflicts of sovereignty have increased in practice and conflicting claims to 
ultimate authority on all sorts of matters constitute a permanent feature in the now pervasive regimes 
of multilevel governance(19) . This is illustrated by the Kompetenz Kompetenz crisis and the 
recurrence of constitutional conflicts in the EU, i.e. conflicts of claims over matters falling into the 
field of ultimate national and European constitutional competence such as fundamental rights or 
basic principles.(20) Besides these threats on external sovereignty posed by the development of 
supra-state and post-state political entities, the emergence of infra-state claims to authority has 
contributed even further to the fragmentation of internal sovereignty.(21)  
With this shift in authority away from the state to new sub-state, supra-state, post-state(22) and non-
state entities, the question is whether the concept of ultimate authority or sovereignty is to be 
abandoned or, on the contrary, retained and, if so, in which form. Faced with these changes, most 
authors still regard the state as a central feature of the new national and international order, be it in 
the context of the conclusion or of the implementation of international law.(23)  
3Some claim, however, that sovereignty has become obsolete in the new post-Westphalian and 
pluralist constitutional order where different legal orders overlap within the same territory and 
population(24) , and that it should therefore be abandoned.(25) Although they usually refer to state 
sovereignty, some extend this verdict to sovereignty in general. Some authors even call for the 
adoption of new concepts that are more apt to seize the new national and international organization.
(26) Others, on the contrary, advocate the concept of sovereignty’s continuity and emphasize the 
central role it continues to play in the current international structure.(27)  
This theoretical and practical state of affairs has gradually given rise to a flourishing literature.(28) 
The issue has not yet been explored from every angle, however.(29) The debate raises interesting 
questions about the nature of the concept of sovereignty and its relationship to the changing political 
and legal reality of the state and the international order more generally. Viewed from a wider angle, 
it is the applicability of statist concepts like sovereignty to the post-national reality which is thrown 
into doubt and it reveals the necessity to translate those concepts into conceptions that do not 
constrain this new reality and hence to develop a post-national jurisprudence.(30) In this context, the 
question this paper addresses is the following: is it really necessary to choose, as most do, between, 
on the one hand, rejecting the concept of sovereignty in order to enter the era of post-sovereignty, 
and, on the other, maintaining it as it is, despite intense changes in the international order? 
Consequently, the paper aims at exploring a third way that would allow us to escape from the two 
types of dualism that contrast state and sovereignty, first, and rejecting and saving sovereignty, 
second.(31)  
The first opposition will not be dealt with in great detail in this paper –the issues it raises have 
already been addressed extensively elsewhere.(32) It contrasts abandoning the concept of state in 
order to save sovereignty in a post-statist world, with abandoning the concept of sovereignty to save 
post-sovereign states.(33) The idea here is, on the contrary, to consider the capacity of adaptation of 
both the concepts of sovereignty and state.(34) Both may be withheld and remain important in 
practice. No one can deny that the state remains one of the key elements of the international order
(35) nor that it is necessary to have a sovereign or ultimate authority(36) to settle conflicts. It is 
important, however, to realize that both concepts can evolve; this can occur either symmetrically 
when state and sovereignty are linked, or asymmetrically when they are dissociated as is often the 
case nowadays –it suffices to look at the Swiss cantons and at the European Union to see that some 
states are not sovereign and some sovereign authorities are not states.(37)  
It is the second opposition between maintaining and rejecting sovereignty that will be addressed in 
more depth and that will hopefully be overcome.(38) It relies on a far too rigid and static approach to 
the concept of sovereignty. The choice should not be between retaining the concept in its state-like 
unitary and absolute conception thus seeking a Kelsenian or Schmittian finalité(39), and requiring an 
exclusive choice between national and European claims to sovereignty for instance, on the one hand, 
and abandoning sovereignty completely, on the other, thus ignoring the epistemic and normative 
resilience of the concept both in practice and theory.(40) The alternative is not to choose between 
realizing the tyranny of statist concepts like sovereignty and rejecting them en bloc, on the one hand, 
and their perpetuation in their rigid statist conceptions without further translation and adaptation to 
the post-national context, on the other.(41) It should be possible to retain the concept of sovereignty 
while allowing it to fluctuate along the lines of current changes in the international community and 
to adapt to the new reality of constitutional pluralism in Europe;(42) it has evolved in this way in the 
past without ever being rejected for doing so.(43) As a result, authors usually do not spend much 
time elaborating on what they take sovereignty to mean in general.(44) One finds limited references 
to supreme authority or ultimate power.(45) These two definitions refer to very different facets of 
 
sovereignty which correspond to its normative and empirical dimensions.(46) This built-in flexibility 
of the concept is even more important as the new international reality has not stabilized yet.(47)  
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If it is possible to conceive of such a third intermediary approach to sovereignty in a post-national 
order, how should this new form of sovereignty be conceptualized? Recently, some authors have 
explored this third path, in the European context in particular,(48) but without yet providing a 
detailed account of the nature of this new form of sovereignty and of its practical implications. This 
paper also aims therefore to develop a more complete account of the complex relationship among 
sovereign authorities in the same political and legal community. The cornerstone of this account is 
captured by the idea of sovereignty in conflict: rather than understanding constitutional conflicts and 
other clashes of sovereignty as a problem requiring either a unitary sovereign resolution or the 
rejection of all sovereign resolutions, the co-existence, competition and mutual adjustment of 
conflicting claims of sovereignty should be regarded as a normal and desirable political and legal 
condition. Conflicts over the concept of sovereignty and competing claims to political and legal 
sovereignty in practice(49) are to be understood as the best way to ensure unity in diversity through a 
reflexive and cooperative decision-making process in each case.(50)  
To address these issues, the paper’s argument is five-pronged. The first section examines the 
relationship between conceptual analysis and political and legal change (Section 1.). The second 
section addresses the concept of essentially contestable concept (Section 2.). In the following 
section, I argue that the concept of sovereignty is essentially contestable, assess its different 
dimensions and draw some implications for the concept’s centrality in our daily political and legal 
debates (Section 3.). Finally, in the last section, I discuss the future of sovereignty in the European 
Union in the light of the theoretical conclusions of the paper (Section 4.).  
1. Reality change and conceptual continuity  
It is important at the opening of the present paper to start by clarifying the relationship between a 
political and legal concept like sovereignty and the object to which it refers. Of course, a certain 
distance between the philosophical analysis of a concept and its legal and political use(51) is 
unavoidable.(52) This paper’s starting point, however, is to claim that a minimal relationship must 
be maintained between a concept and its practice, or else political and legal analysis would become 
avoid.(53)  
Until now, political and legal philosophers have not been very clear on what this relationship should 
be. A majority of authors argues that legal concepts are both descriptive in a first stage and 
prescriptive in a second stage when they constrain reality. Their function is to determine through 
observation and then to prescribe what the essential criteria of those concepts are. In the case of 
sovereignty, for instance, conceptual analysis is about determining the essential qualities of 
sovereignty by reference to its reality and then to capture them in conceptual criteria.(54) These in 
turn will entail certain prescriptions about what a sovereign state or a sovereign legal order can be.
(55) It remains of course possible to adapt and revise the meaning of concepts whose use fluctuates. 
Once a concept has been reassessed, however, its function becomes prescriptive again and implies 
normative constraints on practice.(56) Other authors take a more realistic stance and regard legal 
concepts as mere reflections and descriptions of legal and political reality. Any other approach 
would amount to a purely metaphysical construction whose validity could not be tested in any 
objective way. According to legal realists, the task of legal philosophical concepts is to describe 
those institutions and principles on which positive law and political practice rely effectively.(57)  
5Neither approach is entirely satisfactory, especially when taken to apply to the concept of 
sovereignty. Intense recent developments in international and European law reveal the limits of both 
approaches of political and legal concepts.(58) While the prescriptive approach aims at testing legal 
and practical reality against a pre-existing model of the state and sovereignty, the descriptive one 
seeks to retrieve the content of the concepts of state and sovereignty entirely from a new reality. 
Both approaches put sovereignty at risk by, on the one hand, either corseting reality too tightly thus 
prematurely condemning new political and legal practices and cutting sovereignty off too early from 
reality by redefining it too strictly(59) or, on the other, by emptying it from any content whatsoever 
and thus limiting any possibility of conceptual continuity in the political and legal realm. It follows 
therefore that sovereignty is not a merely prescriptive political concept that insists on constraining 
political and legal reality according to an abstract standard. Nor is it a purely descriptive political 
concept that refers to an independent and objective reality. Sovereignty is more than what those 
entities which claim to be sovereign actually are, but it is less than what pre-existing abstract 
standards of sovereignty may require it should be.(60) Walker refers to these two ways of 
misunderstanding sovereignty as the descriptive fallacy and the fallacy of abstraction.(61)  
Although neither approach is founded per se, they can be reconciled and propounded together.(62) 
Like other legal and political concepts, sovereignty should account for political and legal reality and 
should therefore be able to fluctuate with it, although this mirroring effect cannot always be perfect. 
This does not mean, however, that the concept of sovereignty should not retain a certain normative 
impact on political and legal reality, although this impact should not lead to corseting political 
reality.(63) A third and combined approach to legal and political concepts like sovereignty is 
therefore needed to reconcile the normative role of sovereignty with the profound changes in the 
political and legal reality. Sovereignty, like other central political and legal concepts, should be 
neither entirely closed nor entirely open; it should neither encompass all changes of reality, nor 
exclude any change of its paradigms, i.e. of its central exemplars in practice. Sovereignty is therefore 
best understood as what one calls in philosophy of language an essentially contestable concept.(64) 
Because the concept expresses one or many values it aims at protecting, different evaluations and 
conceptions of it can be given and this contestable nature is one of its main features.(65)  
Sovereignty should be entitled to remain the same concept and hence establish a conceptual 
framework in which debates can take place,(66) while also fluctuating at the same time through 
changes of paradigms and of conceptions;(67) the essential contestability of sovereignty ‘can 
account for both change and for continuity in change(68)’. Instead of understanding sovereignty as a 
mere fact or as a purely normative standard, the concept’s essential contestability makes it possible 
to account for its institutional and discursive resilience while also respecting its normative input;(69) 
some authors also refer to the double hermeneutic of sovereignty(70) and the fact that the concept of 
sovereignty is not only an interpretation of the world, but that this interpretation is already part of 
that world and of its ‘sedimented discourse(71)’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62. The concept of ‘essentially contestable concept’   
2.1. A definition of the concept  
One of the objectives of this paper is to establish that the concept of sovereignty not only amounts to 
a complex and normative concept, but also that it is an essentially contestable concept. As such, it is 
a concept that not only expresses a normative standard and whose conceptions differ from one 
person to the other, but whose correct application is to create disagreement over its correct 
application or, in other words, over what the concept is itself. The concept of ‘essentially contestable 
concept’ owes its original formulation to William Gallie.(72) Since then, the concept has been re-
used and further developed in moral and political philosophy,(73) but also in legal philosophy(74) – 
although not always in a discerning manner.  
Traditional approaches to normative concepts, like the concepts of democracy or justice, are 
extremely cautious about the role of contestation. They do not consider normative contestation as 
part of those concepts’ correct application. On the contrary, most authors distinguish between the 
phase of descriptive conceptual analysis, on the one hand, through which it is possible to identify and 
establish minimal criteria of application of normative concepts in an objective way and the 
normative discussion of these concepts, on the other, during which phase only it is possible to 
contest the assessment of the values those concepts encompass and protect.(75) It is crucial to 
understand, however, that disputes which surround normative concepts cannot be compared to those 
about criterial concepts such as ‘book’ or ‘chair’. In those cases, there is sufficient consensus to 
accept the existence of minimal criteria of correct application and contestation over those criteria can 
be explained in terms of error.(76) In the case of normative concepts, however, contestation goes to 
the heart of the concepts and is not limited to its peripheral cases of application,(77) without it being 
necessarily evident that those contesting so-called criteria of application are necessarily mistaken.
(78) It is implausible in those conditions to separate prior conceptual analysis from normative 
contestation.(79)  
To claim essential contestability, it is surely not enough to say that a concept is normative; it is a 
necessary condition for it to encompass one or many values, but it is not a sufficient condition since 
some normative standards might be pre-established in a criterial way. Nor is it enough to refer to the 
evidence of its historical and cultural variability and the disputes over its correct application. 
Empirical and contingent claims like these would be claims of mere contestedness. To claim that a 
concept is contestable is to make the analytical claim that debates about the criteria of correct 
application of a concept are inconclusive.(80) Finally, to claim that a concept’s subject matter is such 
that there are always good reasons for someone to dispute the propriety of any of its uses, is to claim 
its essential contestability; the ‘essentiality’ of its contestability does not mean that the 
disagreements that surround its meaning are irresolvable,(81) but that, on the one hand, disputes 
about the meaning of the concept go to the heart of the matter and can generate rival paradigms and 
criteria of application and that, on the other, it is part of the very nature of the concept to be 
contested and to raise questions as to its nature.(82)  
In Connolly’s slightly refined version(83) of Gallie’s definition of essentially contestable concepts,
(84) a concept is essentially contestable  
1. when it is appraisive in that the state of affairs it describes is a valued achievement which is 
initially variously describable,(85)  
2. when this state of affairs is internally complex in that its characterization involves references 
to several dimensions of meaning(86) as opposed to judging something to be ‘red’, and 
3. when its criteria of application – whether shared or disputed- are themselves relatively open, 
enabling parties to interpret even shared criteria differently, both across a range of familiar 
cases and as new and unforeseen circumstances arise.  
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2.2 Some implications   
After this brief clarification of the concept of essentially contestable concepts, it is important to 
discuss two implications of the use of such concepts.  
First of all, the recognition of the existence of essentially contestable concepts does not imply taking 
a sceptical stance.(87) It is entirely consistent with the existence of objective values; although the 
concept of justice is contestable and although parties to the disagreement hold reasonable but 
conflicting conceptions of it, this does not prevent one of them from being right and the other wrong. 
This explains why the recognition of essentially contestable concepts on the part of participants in 
the political discourse is compatible with the willingness to deliberate and exchange arguments with 
others; one may hope to convince others without, however, necessarily having to believe that it is 
possible to find the right conception in all cases.(88)  
Secondly, the recognition of the essentially contestable nature of a concept is an analytical 
statement. It implies the possibility of conceiving a concept as normative, that is to say as 
encompassing a contestable value. It does not therefore protect against analytical mistakes or errors 
of judgement.(89) It is important to note that what enables the parties to know that their 
disagreement about an essentially contestable concept pertains to the same concept and not to two 
different concepts lies in the exemplars or paradigms they share before starting the discussion. These 
are provided by those central cases in which the concept clearly applies. What distinguishes 
paradigms from criteria and agreement over them(90), however, is the evolutive nature of the 
former; paradigms adapt to new circumstances and can be entirely ousted in favour of new 
paradigms in the course of discussion, provided these changes are made gradually and that some 
minimal paradigms are shared to start the discussion.(91) 
3. Sovereignty qua essentially contestable concept  
There are three main conditions to be fulfilled for the concept of sovereignty to be regarded as an 
essentially contestable concept: the concept must be normative, intrinsically complex and a-criterial. 
3.1. Sovereignty qua normative concept  
As a normative concept, the concept of sovereignty expresses and incorporates one or many values 
that it seeks to implement in practice and according to which political situations should be evaluated.
(92) These values are diverse and include, among others, democracy, human rights, equality and 
self-determination.  
Concept determination amounts therefore to more than a mere description of the concept’s core 
application criteria; it implies an evaluation of a state of affairs on the basis of sovereignty’s 
incorporated values. What lies behind the prima facie categorical use of central political and legal 
concepts like sovereignty are not facts that should be established, but conceptions and interpretations 
that should be evaluated and maybe amended in order to account better for the values encompassed 
by these concepts.(93) It follows therefore that the determination of the concept of sovereignty 
cannot be distinguished from the values it entails and from the normative discussion that generally 
prevails around it.(94)  
8
3.2. Sovereignty qua complex concept   
The second condition for the essentially contestable nature of the concept of sovereignty is the 
complexity of the concept. The concept of sovereignty clearly encompasses different dimensions of 
meaning by contrast to a simple concept like ‘chair’. There are three main dimensions one should 
mention: the concept of sovereignty qua outcome, the concept of sovereignty qua question and the 
concept of sovereignty qua value. Sovereignty is therefore at once a result, a question as to what this 
result should be and a justification of this result in terms of values.(95)  
3.2.1. The complexity of sovereignty qua outcome  
The difficulty of general concepts like the concept of sovereignty is that they give rise to a plurality 
of criteria and principles whose content is extremely contestable. These different criteria constitute 
what can be referred to as the concept qua outcome or result-concept of sovereignty; they contribute 
to determining what sovereignty is as a state of affairs or achievement.(96) These criteria qualify the 
minimal and relatively uncontroversial statement of sovereignty as the ultimate and supreme 
authority or power of decision and are sometimes described as constitutive rules of sovereignty.(97) 
They are heavily contested in practice, not only per se, but also inside each group of oppositions 
where different conceptions can be defended.  
3.2.1.1. Political and legal sovereignty  
Political and legal sovereignty have always been closely linked in the history of the concept; most 
theories either derive legal sovereignty from political sovereignty or vice-versa. The paradox of 
pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué or of rule sovereignty and ruler sovereignty is inextricably 
tied to the claim to sovereignty; political sovereignty is difficult to conceive without rules to exercize 
and constrain that sovereignty, but legal sovereignty is hard to fathom without a political power to 
establish its legal rules in the first place.  
Different accounts have been given of the priority between political and legal sovereignty across the 
centuries and have contributed to perpetuating the centrality of the concept of sovereignty. Some 
authors have even argued that this paradox and mutual claim are testimony of the conceptual 
incoherence of sovereignty.(98) While Austin and command theorists give priority to political 
sovereignty over legal sovereignty, Hart and recent positivists give priority to legal sovereignty over 
political sovereignty.(99) Other authors like Kelsen argue, on the contrary, that political and legal 
sovereignty are identical and cannot therefore be put in any relationship of priority.(100) More 
recently, some authors have tried to dissociate legal and political sovereignty and re-associate legal 
to institutional sovereignty.(101) At a time when state and law, and more generally the political and 
the legal tend to drift apart in practice, as demonstrated by the emergence of the European legal 
order, the development of lex mercatoria and other forms of transnational global law,(102) the 
sovereignty of law must somehow be able to be kept conceptually distinct from the state and maybe 
from political sovereignty. The question that arises is the following: while it must be possible to 
distinguish political and legal sovereignty from each other, is it possible to do so without giving one 
priority over the other but without, however, having to give one up for the other?(103)  
 
 
9The law remains a political instrument and creation, whether at the national, European or 
international level. As a consequence, legal sovereignty will most of the time match political 
sovereignty.(104) It is difficult to see how the sovereignty of European law, for instance, can be 
pertinent outside its relationship to political sovereignty in the EU in the field of competence of the 
legal norm in question. Conversely, however, it is difficult to understand how political sovereignty 
can be exercized in the EU without legal sovereignty, in particular with respect to the constitutional 
determination of the structure of political power and competences.(105) Sovereignty amounts to the 
competence of a political entity,(106) hence the idea of ‘competence of the 
competence’ (‘Kompetenz Kompetenz’) and the difficulty to establish one’s own competences 
without legal sovereignty. It follows therefore that legal and political sovereignty, even though they 
are conceptually distinct, are not separable in practice in the long run.(107) This also implies that 
when they are both granted, neither of them can be given priority over the other. There is, in other 
words, an imperfect relationship between the two forms of sovereignty.(108)  
In fact, this interpretation of the relationship between political and legal sovereignty solves a long-
standing paradox or at least makes the most of it.(109) Sovereignty should be situated at the 
boundary between politics and law or between democracy and rights, rather than being clearly 
embedded in one or the other. As Walker argues, the double claim to political and legal sovereignty 
should ‘be viewed more constructively as the conceptual key to sovereignty as a dynamic process of 
mutual constitution and mutual containment of law and politics’(110). It is crucial for the 
legitimating effect of the competitive and cooperative exercize of sovereignty in the EU that it be 
subordinated neither entirely to a legal and normative division of competences nor entirely to 
political power and to the rule of the majority.(111) On the contrary, both legal and political 
sovereignty should be kept in tension and mutual relationship for the values protected by both forms 
of sovereignty to be enforced.(112)  
3.2.1.2. External and internal sovereignty  
Traditionally, the concept of sovereignty has always operated in two distinct ways: sovereignty can 
be exercized in relation to one’s internal affairs, on the one hand, but also to one’s external affairs, 
on the other. Even though there exists a historical and link between these two forms of sovereignty, 
it is important to distinguish between them conceptually. First of all, different institutions exercize 
sovereignty in both cases: the executive acts as a sovereign in external affairs, while it is usually the 
legislative which is regarded as sovereign in internal affairs. Hence the difficulty there is sometimes 
of distinguishing between parliamentary sovereignty on the inside and national sovereignty on the 
outside.(113) Secondly, their functions differ; whereas internal sovereignty pertains to all political 
and legal matters, external sovereignty usually only relates to questions of cooperation among 
distinct sovereign entities. Finally, external sovereignty can less easily be described as final or 
ultimate; it can only be equally ultimate since a sovereign can only co-exist as an equal to other 
sovereigns.(114) In internal affairs, however, sovereignty is usually final.  
Although both forms of sovereignty may be kept conceptually distinct,(115) they cannot be 
separated in practice; for there to be external sovereignty, there must be internal sovereignty and 
vice-versa.(116) Without external sovereignty, indeed, the internal sovereign cannot define the latter 
and without internal sovereignty in the constitutional determination of competences, there cannot be 
an external sovereign and no human rights limitations in particular.(117) It is difficult therefore to 
place one before the other in an order of emergence.(118) This issue is particularly relevant in the 
European context. Contrary to federal states, the European Union was not created through the 
gradual concession of Member States’ external sovereignty.(119)
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Most transfers of competence relate to internal matters. Many authors have deduced from this that 
the only kind of sovereignty one should be concerned with in the European context is internal 
sovereignty.(120) This, however, underestimates the strength of the bond between these two forms 
of sovereignty; with less internal sovereignty, external sovereignty is also affected and has gradually 
shrunk at national level.(121)  
3.2.1.3. Absolute and limited sovereignty  
The question of the degree of power and amount of competence necessary for an entity to become or 
remain sovereign has given rise to a long controversy in the history of the concept. According to 
some authors, sovereignty can only be absolute. This is the classical conception of sovereignty one 
finds in Bodin and Hobbes in particular. This position does not hold, however, once internal 
sovereignty is understood together with external sovereignty. External sovereignty can never be 
regarded as ultimate or final; it is inherently limited since public international law and external 
sovereignty imply each other.(122) Without rules of international law, sovereignty would be reduced 
to mere factual power.(123) These inherent limitations to external sovereignty have also become 
constitutive limitations to internal sovereignty(124) given the internal impact of many external 
agreements, such as human rights instruments, for instance. Finally, this absolute conception of 
sovereignty cannot account satisfactorily for new developments in political and legal organization. 
More precisely, it ignores the plurality of sources of law and power in the new world order and what 
is often referred as constitutional pluralism, i.e. the post-Westphalian order characterized by the co-
existence of autonomous constitutional orders in the same political and legal community and 
territory.(125)  
In response to these difficulties, some authors have suggested the idea of limited sovereignty. The 
problem arising from this model is to know when sovereignty is so limited or fragmented that there 
can be no talk of sovereignty anymore. The concept of sovereignty implies a certain amount of 
intensity or of competence over a range of matters.(126) As we saw before, sovereignty is a general 
competence, i.e. a competence to determine one’s particular competence; as such, it requires a 
minimal level of control over those competences. In other words, is there a threshold below which 
sovereignty is emptied of any content and if so, where does it lie? Some authors have denied this 
identification of sovereignty with a threshold-concept.(127) One argument against it may reside in 
the contestation of sovereignty and hence of this minimal threshold. As I explained before, however, 
the essentially contestable nature of the concept of sovereignty is an analytical statement which is 
perfectly compatible with the recognition of the normative content of the concept and of its 
contestability. One might therefore consider that these minimal threshold constraints are part of the 
analytical framework one has to assume when using a contestable concept, i.e. that it is a concept, 
that it protects certain values, that it is contestable, etc.(128)  
It remains difficult, however, to establish where the minimal threshold of sovereignty lies.(129) 
Some authors merely agree with the idea of a threshold without providing more information.(130) 
Others enumerate different competences which might constitute a minimal threshold of authority and 
be used to identify a sovereign entity.(131) They mention territorial supremacy, control over 
nationality acquisition, immigration control or national security.(132) Others on the contrary 
mention different competences, but add that their absence does not affect the existence of 
sovereignty.(133) Generally, the problem is the absence of consensus and the constant change in the 
paradigmatic constitutive elements of sovereignty. The content of the threshold cannot but remain 
contestable and different paradigms have been used at different times in the history of the concept of 
sovereignty.(134) For instance, purely territorial sovereignty has gradually been replaced by a 
differentiated and overlapping functional form of sovereignty in the EU.(135) It is therefore one of 
the characteristics of sovereignty to be a threshold-concept, whose threshold itself is contestable over 
time.  
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3.2.1.4. Unitary and divided sovereignty  
Another related distinction pertains to the divisibility of sovereignty.(136) In fact, both issues are 
very closely connected and often conflated. Traditional and recent literature refer to absolute 
sovereignty to mean unlimited sovereignty as much as indivisible sovereignty.(137) For the sake of 
clarity, I will refer to absolute sovereignty by contrast to limited sovereignty only, although divided 
sovereignty can obviously no longer be deemed absolute. The opposition between unitary and 
divided sovereignty is a traditional one. Authors like Bodin or Hobbes fear the division of 
sovereignty as much as its limitation. In a post-Westphalian world where competences are not only 
limited, but also shared, however, such fears have become obsolete. Divisions of competences are 
indeed the rule in the European Union and beyond(138). This applies in almost all domains and at all 
degrees of authority. Sometimes, it is even more than a matter of fact, as shown by the possibility to 
transfer sovereign competences provided by Art. 23 of the German Basic Law.(139) Of course, some 
have argued that sovereignty is not strictly divided in those cases, but that it is its exercize that is 
delegated and hence divided,(140) thus preserving sovereignty’s unity.(141) This argument cannot, 
however, account for the extremely high degree and complexity of transfers of competence in the EU 
in particular.(142)  
In response to the limits of the unitary approach to sovereignty, the idea of disaggregation and 
reaggregation of sovereignty has been brought forward by some to grasp the poly-centred dimension 
of contemporary sovereignty.(143) The problem with this kind of model of pooled, divided or shared 
sovereignty, however, is that by being everywhere, it seems that sovereignty is nowhere particularly 
important.(144) As Walker argues, pooled sovereignty sits ‘uneasily with the sense of sovereignty as 
a unifying and self-identifying claim made on behalf of the polity’(145). It is important therefore to 
account for a minimal threshold of competences which may neither be limited nor shared. As we will 
see later, there is a third approach to sovereignty in a post-Westphalian world that is neither unitary 
nor pooled but that does not abandon the idea of ultimate power and authority altogether; it is the 
idea of cooperative sovereignty. It is crucial to understand that the possibility of conflicts and 
divisions in the absence of a unitary conception of sovereignty need not be conceived as problem; as 
we will see, these conflicts belong to democratic life and we should make the most of them by 
promoting dialogue and duties of mutual adjustment in plurality.(146)  
3.2.1.5. Institutional and popular sovereignty  
This last distinction goes back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s account of political sovereignty and the 
dissociation of the original sovereignty of the demos from that of political institutions. According to 
this conception, political authorities’ sovereignty is transferred to them through a social contract 
which binds them and holds them accountable to the original sovereign: the people.(147) Through 
the social contract, the people constitutes itself as a distinct entity and sovereign while also 
transferring the exercize of its sovereignty to a constituted institutional sovereign. Thus, political and 
popular sovereignty are reunited, and then artificially separated in order to bind the sovereign to the 
people. Political sovereignty becomes a mere reflection of popular sovereignty; if the sovereign does 
not respect popular will, it risks losing its attributions. Sovereignty and democracy are clearly bound 
and sovereignty can both be deemed absolute when it is original, and limited when it corresponds to 
derived political or institutional sovereignty.  
 
12
The principle of popular sovereignty presents the advantage of providing a ready link between 
democracy and political participation, on the one hand, and sovereignty, on the other. It also lies at 
the origins of the connection between sovereignty and self-determination or national autonomy.(148)
These issues play out in the European context where the democratic specificities of the European 
construction require conceptual imagination with respect to the relationships between national and 
European popular sovereignties and the many European demoi.(149)  
3.2.2. The complexity of sovereignty qua question  
This second form of complexity is generated by the different answers that can be given to the 
question of what the best allocation of power is in each case, i.e. the different interpretations given to 
sovereignty qua outcome. The concept of sovereignty’s specificity is that it does not only consist of 
a way to evaluate an outcome, but also of a normative question about what this outcome should be 
and how it should be reached.(150) It is a question-concept or a reflexive concept in the sense that it 
is part of its nature and application to constantly question what sovereignty is about.(151)  
3.2.2.1. From sovereignty qua question to subsidiarity  
Given the complexity of the question of sovereignty, the concept’s correct application implies a 
constant debate about how best to achieve sovereignty. Paradoxically, this approach to sovereignty is 
not without resemblance with the principle that is usually taken to be its opposite:(152) the principle 
of subsidiarity.(153) The principle of subsidiarity is just as contestable a concept as that of 
sovereignty(154) , maybe intentionally so.(155) As a concept of power distribution, it is usually said 
to date back to the social and political theory of the Catholic Church, although both concepts no 
longer have much in common.(156) In a nutshell, the principle of subsidiarity is a power allocation 
principle: it requires that the entity that can best achieve a task be in charge of it.(157) It was 
introduced in European law by Art. 5(2) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (ECT). It constitutes one of the key principles of the division of competences 
in the European Union; in the absence of exclusive competence, European authorities can only take 
action when the objectives of the proposed action cannot be satisfactorily attained by Member States 
and therefore have a better chance of being achieved by the Community.(158)  
Read together with sovereignty qua reflexive concept, the principle of subsidiarity implies a test of 
efficiency in power allocation. In each case, the sovereign authority will be that authority which can 
realize the objective in the most efficient way.(159) This applies to cases where different authorities 
claim sovereignty on the same issues, without any preference for the larger or smaller unit. For 
instance, since democratic rule is one of the shared values protected by sovereignty, sovereignty may 
require allowing another authority to decide in a specific case if that endows those affected by that 
decision with a stronger voice and hearing. This does not mean that subsidiarity is itself a democratic 
principle; it may ensure the best realization of democracy possible, but cannot be identified with it. 
Just as one needs to identify a sovereign power before subsidiarity can apply, one needs to identify a 
democratic one for subsidiarity to ensure the best democratic allocation of power.(160)  
This allocation of competences may be achieved through mutual adjustment and consistency in 
principle with one authority abiding by the other’s past decisions on the issue, but also through 
actual delegation and transfer of competences;(161) sovereignty may indeed have to be transferred in 
parts to ensure the best realization of the values it protects.(162) In all cases, this decision is a 
sovereign one, because it is not pre-decided and sovereignty has not been shared or divided; 
questioning, emulation and cooperation are part of the regular exercize of sovereignty.(163) As 
MacCormick argues, therefore,  
13
‘Europe’s new way of parcelling out powers opens the door to a conception of 
subsidiarity that could gradually acquire real teeth. That is to say, once a process of 
sharing out powers is seriously undertaken, one can ask the question where it is best for 
the common good that a particular power be exercised.’ (164) 
3.2.2.2. Cooperative sovereignty 
Respecting subsidiarity in the fulfilment of one’s sovereign tasks and duties can be considered as 
part of the correct application of the concept of sovereignty.(165) Because the preference is not 
necessarily given to the smaller unit, but to the best substantive outcome, this combined reading of 
sovereignty and subsidiarity can provide just the right balance between integration and subsidiarity.
(166) Ever since its creation, the European Union has been oscillating between strong unification, on 
the one hand, and subsidiarity, on the other. As the European Union is deeply pluralist and 
disagreement-ridden, none of these alternatives has been in itself very promising; unification would 
undermine the flourishing of a political culture within Member States and subsidiarity would 
undermine it between them. Hence the attractiveness of a conception of sovereignty that would 
enable Europe to escape from this dualism between alienation and fragmentation, and this is 
precisely what cooperative sovereignty can provide.  
What the relationship between sovereignty qua question and subsidiarity reveals indeed is that 
gradually the exercize of sovereignty has turned from an individual exercize into a cooperative 
enterprise.(167) This corresponds to the more general development of multilevel governance in a 
post-national constellation;(168) sovereign political entities can no longer exercize their traditional 
competences and functions alone, especially, but not only, when these overlap within the same 
territory and apply to the same legal and political community.(169) This community encompasses all 
sovereign authorities which are active in that community and whose rules and decisions affect the 
same people in that community. This is the case of European and national authorities in the EU or of 
international and national authorities in the global world. In these conditions, sovereign authorities 
need to collaborate with other sovereign political and legal entities when applying the same rules and 
principles in this pluralist constitutional order(170) and this gives rise to a participative or 
cooperative form of sovereignty.(171) This form of sovereignty triggers duties of cooperation on the 
part of entities which cannot ensure the protection of all the values they should protect, as much as 
on the part of entities which can help the former protect those values they share.(172) They should 
all be seen as working towards the same end: the realization of their shared sovereign values and 
principles, such as human rights or democratic standards.(173)  
Only when understood in this cooperative way, can sovereignty be the reflexive and dynamic 
concept it is, stimulating constant challenging of the allocation of power, thus putting into question 
others’ sovereignty as well as one’s own.(174) This common exercize of political sovereignty is then 
reflected in the structure of the relationship between the different legal orders at stake; none of them 
is ultimately and entirely submitted to another. This kind of legal cooperation reveals the possibility 
of a non-hierarchically organized plurality of legal orders, which may individually remain 
hierarchical in their internal structure or in their relationship to international law(175) , but which 
relate to one another in a heterarchical way.(176)  
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3.2.3. The complexity of sovereignty qua value  
3.2.3.1. The plurality of values of sovereignty  
This last form of complexity flows from the plurality of values and normative standards that the 
concept of sovereignty protects and to which it is held accountable. This gives a new significance to 
the 17th century conception of sovereignty qua function rather than personified authority;(177) it is 
not the identity of the political entity which determines its sovereignty, but only the values it pursues 
under the umbrella of sovereignty.  
Understood along these lines, sovereignty is not an empirical end in itself, but should be exercized to 
protect the different values which constitute its justification.(178) These include equality, human 
rights,(179) democracy,(180) national self-determination(181) or other values protected in the 
international community(182) such as tolerance, stability or cultural pluralism.(183) It is actually 
part of the complexity of sovereignty qua question for the values it protects to be contestable; in the 
course of the history of contestation of the concept, normative standards have not always been part 
of the concept of sovereignty and whenever they were, they were not always the same.  
3.2.3.2. Human rights protection qua criterion of sovereignty  
The co-existence and interdependence of a plurality of sovereign states give rise to difficulties which 
call for consensually agreed upon rules of international law. Besides those conventional rules, 
however, the growing interdependence of states has also generated further rules of ius cogens, or 
more precisely, a universal human rights code, which apply to all sovereign states, whether they 
accept them or not.(184) Since, as we have seen before, those limits are now regarded as inherent to 
external sovereignty, they have also consequently become a constitutive element of internal 
sovereignty for reasons related to those two facets of sovereignty’s conceptual connection.(185) 
Human rights constitute one of the values incorporated and protected by contemporary political and 
legal sovereignty, that is to say one of the goals of the exercize of sovereignty(186) and one of the 
standards according to which we should hold that exercize accountable.(187) This relationship 
between the justification of sovereignty and the protection of human rights has different implications 
for cases where sovereign authorities overlap in their areas of sovereignty while being held 
accountable to the same human rights instruments and fundamental principles.(188) The most 
important implication is that any activity related to the potentially cooperative exercize of 
sovereignty should aim at the protection of human rights as far as possible.(189) This applies to the 
transfer of competences of sovereignty, as much as to the intervention in case of negligence of these 
competences.  
Primarily, the legitimacy of a transfer of sovereign competences from one political entity to the next 
depends on the conditions inherent in the exercize of sovereignty and these include the protection of 
human rights. Both the entity which transfers and the entity which receives sovereign competences 
should ensure human rights are better protected by this transfer. For a long time, and until human 
rights protection was ensured at a sufficient level within the European legal order, this was a very 
important issue in the European Union; Germany, for instance, has a reference to the protection of 
fundamental rights in its constitutional clause on the transfer of sovereignty to the European Union.
(190) According to the principle proposed here, transfers of sovereignty might not only be limited by 
human rights, but might also be required to ensure their better protection. It might well be, for 
instance, that the transfer of a particular competence to the EU might protect a national minority’s 
interests much better than national decisions,(191) thus putting pressure on national authorities to 
 
improve the situation at the national level or else to transfer the competence to the European level.
(192)  
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Secondly, in the case where a sovereign political entity neglects its human rights obligations, a 
humanitarian intervention may be called on human rights grounds and hence on sovereignty 
grounds. Indeed, the sovereignty of a ‘failed’ sovereign(193) requires that it seek ways of ensuring 
its duties and this may encompass accepting or even calling for an external intervention.(194) It is 
more complex to determine whether there is a right of the population, and respectively an obligation 
on the part of others to such an external intervention. It is difficult, however, to see how a sovereign 
entity could be held to accept external intervention aiming at re-establishing its sovereignty on 
grounds of its very own sovereignty, while this sovereign entity could be exempted from a duty to 
intervene outside of its own frontiers or competences when it could protect those very rights in other 
sovereign entities much better than the direct sovereign authorities themselves.(195)  
3.3. Sovereignty qua a-criterial concept   
The third condition for sovereignty to be identified with an essentially contestable concept is its a-
criterial nature, that is to say the absence of immutable minimal criteria of correct application. The 
concept of sovereignty has no immutable core criteria that should be given for there to be a 
sovereign; all its criteria of application can be disputed.(196) Disagreement over sovereignty is not 
limited to conflict over its periphery and applications, since disagreement on its core criteria cannot 
usually be blamed on a misunderstanding or conceptual confusion.  
Of course, disagreement over contestable concepts like sovereignty needs to start on some common 
ground, but this shared starting point need not be constituted by core criteria;(197) parties can start 
by sharing paradigms which they can then progressively amend until they have reached new 
conceptions of the same concept.(198) For instance, control over one’s territory(199) and the 
principle of non-intervention(200) were for a long time the paradigms of state sovereignty; they have 
now gradually been abandoned and replaced by more substantive paradigms like the protection of 
human rights.(201) This constant renewal of paradigms explains how the concept of sovereignty can 
both be the starting point and the outcome of political debates. Sovereignty enables us to identify 
what characterizes a common phenomenon, while at the same time allowing for the identification to 
be questioned and reassessed thus renewing paradigms in the course of discussion.(202)  
3.4. Implications of the contestability of sovereignty   
Although essentially contestable concepts like the concept of sovereignty generate much contestation 
and complexity, their presence and discussion should be encouraged. This is not an uncontroversial 
position to take;(203) some authors have been very critical of the advantages of holding on to the 
concept of sovereignty(204) and Stephen Krasner has made this position famous by referring to 
sovereignty talk as ‘organised hypocrisy’(205). 
It is important to understand that contestability, rather than impoverishing debates, is likely instead 
to enrich intellectual life and promote tolerance within it.(206) Like other essentially contestable 
concepts, sovereignty’s centrality in political debates increases its contestability,(207) but it is its 
very contestability that makes it a central and indispensable element of debates over the best 
allocation of power.(208) In fact, disagreement and conflict are constitutive elements of those 
concepts, hence the idea of sovereignty in conflict.(209)  
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As a consequence, and despite chaotic appearances, it is vital for political and legal discourse as well 
as the development of sovereignty that debates about it not be censored. It is precisely because 
sovereignty is a contestable concept that it is important to discuss it rather than set it aside on 
grounds of indeterminacy.(210) It is through the plurality of conceptions it can give rise to that the 
concept of sovereignty can play its crucial political role in a changing world; it can both adapt itself 
to a new reality and stimulate further debate on a better allocation of power.  
4. The future of sovereignty in Europe  
4.1. General  
These contentions about the implications of the contestability of sovereignty apply with a particular 
urgency to the European context(211) where the question of sovereignty has triggered heavy 
controversies for the past fifteen years.(212) This is hardly surprising given that, in fifty years, the 
European economic integration project has progressively turned into a political and legal 
construction whose nature is still indeterminate and unprecedented in political and legal history; 
different degrees of cooperation and overlapping competences between Member States and the 
European Union, that do not correspond to any of the known political categories, are now in place 
within the same territory and within the same political and legal community. The Union is neither an 
ordinary international organization or confederation of sovereign states, given its independent 
decision powers and direct relationship to its subjects(213) nor a federal and sovereign super-state 
given the absence of transfer of the Member States’ traditional attributes to the Union(214). 
Similarly, on a more legal level, the European legal order is autonomous and amounts to more than 
an international treaty subordinated to national law, but it is not a state-like unified legal order that 
integrates national legal orders in a hierarchical way. Somewhere in between lies the Union qua sui 
generis post-national and polycentered albeit sovereign political and legal construction whose impact 
on Member States’ retained sovereignty is still to be assessed.  
Both the Union and the Member States have adopted very clear positions on the issue of the 
supremacy of European law, but their conceptions do not correspond to each other; each of them 
regards its own authority as absolute, original and supreme and thus as having the Kompetenz 
Kompetenz.(215) Hence the frequency and degree of constitutional conflicts encountered in the EU 
in the past fifteen years.(216) Neither the Treaties nor European practice entail a precise division of 
powers and this trend has not been reversed by the Draft Constitutional Treaty despite important 
clarifications and an express guarantee of the previously unwritten principle of supremacy of 
European law in Art. I-10(217) . In other words, the constitutional pluralism which characterizes the 
European legal order lato sensu seems difficult to reconcile with traditional conceptions of unitary 
sovereignty. This does not mean, however, that sovereignty is lost in Europe nor that we have moved 
beyond sovereignty and need to redefine it. All it reveals is that paradigms of sovereignty have 
changed and that new conceptions have emerged that conflict with prior ones, thus confirming the 
essentially contestable nature of the concept of sovereignty.  
There are many implications to the contestability of sovereignty in Europe. Most importantly, it 
allows all sides of the debate to hold on to their conceptions of sovereignty and of its relationship to 
their respective legal orders. Besides, thanks to the perpetuation of the concept of sovereignty and of 
the debates it generates, progress can be made without incurring a breach with the past. This state of 
collective uncertainty may therefore be regarded as intentional or at least beneficial in the European 
context. Some authors, like Ian Ward or Catherine Richmond, actually emphasize the importance of 
 
preserving the European identity crisis through perpetuating the contestability of the concept of 
sovereignty.(218)  
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4.2. Current conceptions of sovereignty   
So far, and very schematically, there have been three major alternative conceptions of sovereignty in 
Europe.  
To start with, some authors still propound an absolute and unitary conception of sovereignty that 
does not really fit the pluralist European legal reality. According to them, sovereignty on specific 
matters must belong either to Member States or to the EU, but cannot belong to both, hence the 
conflicting narratives one encounters on either side of the debate(219) and the ‘revolt or revolution’ 
nexus.(220) Unitary accounts of sovereignty in the EU can be divided into two main groups. The 
first group encompasses mostly national intergovernmentalists(221) , who understand national 
constitutions as the ultimate legal rule in the EU, or European supranationalists(222) , who on the 
contrary see national constitutions as subordinated to the European legal order. As to the second 
group, it encompasses very different authors like the latest Neil MacCormick(223) or Ingolf Pernice
(224) who share the common view that although European political and legal reality is pluralistic 
and calls for a more flexible account of sovereignty, sovereignty remains a unitary phenomenon 
according to which ultimate decision-making authority ought to be exercized in a one-dimensional 
way whether at the European or international level.(225) The difficulty with these approaches is, to 
quote Walker, ‘the myopic partiality of simple unitary positions in the face of substantial evidence of 
growing constitutional plurality’, as well as the doubtful ‘capacity even of the more complex and 
sophisticated unitarianism of multi-level constitutionalism and its ilk to sustain robust pluralist 
political premises(226)’. It is important to emphasize that, contrary to what some have argued, the 
failure of the unitary model of sovereignty will not be redeemed by the European constitutional 
exercize. It is possible to reconcile the existence of a Constitutional Treaty and the consolidation of 
the constitutional legitimacy of the European polity, on the one hand, with constitutional pluralism 
and the co-existence of both European and national sovereignty, on the other.(227)  
In response to the failure of the unitary sovereignty model in the EU, a second group of conceptions 
of sovereignty has emerged. The idea of disaggregation and reaggregation of sovereignty has been 
brought forward to grasp the poly-centred dimension of sovereignty in Europe. The problem with 
this kind of pooled or shared sovereignty, however, is that by being everywhere, it seems that it is 
nowhere particularly important.(228) As Walker argues, pooled sovereignty sits ‘uneasily with the 
sense of sovereignty as a unifying and self-identifying claim made on behalf of the polity(229)’. 
Although many authors have defended a pooled or divided conception of sovereignty at one stage or 
another from the early 1970s to the early 1990s,(230) most seem to have moved away from it, either 
to go back to a unitary model of sovereignty or to move towards a resolutely post-sovereign stance.  
A third approach dispenses entirely with the concept of sovereignty. After all, the tyranny of statist 
concepts is a well-known fact(231) and there is no reason why the organization of a post-national 
polity like the EU should follow the same rules as national polities.(232) The difficulty with the 
early MacCormick’s and others’ claims to post-sovereignty, however, lies in their blindness to the 
essential epistemic and normative role of sovereignty,(233) whether it is attached to states or other 
sub-national or post-national political entities. Claims to ultimate authority and finalité are regularly 
made by national and EU authorities, be it by the judiciary or other authorities and be it in the form 
of claims to sovereignty or of claims to identity and self-determination(234) . These claims arise in 
very diverse regulatory fields such as those of nationality and citizenship acquisition,(235) monetary 
regulation(236) or fundamental rights.(237) Sovereignty is too deeply entrenched in our legal and 
political language and too prevalent in public debate to be ignored as an object of serious theoretical 
reflection.(238)  
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4.3. Cooperative sovereignty in Europe  
If it is true that our conceptions of sovereignty in Europe should not map unitary conceptions of 
sovereignty too closely,(239) this need not imply a complete rejection but only a more adequate 
translation of the concept in the European post-national context. It is possible to opt for a fourth 
conception that fits current legal paradigms in Europe better and in particular its constitutional 
pluralism(240). Sovereignty in Europe could very well be conceived as both ultimate and pluralistic 
along the lines of the cooperative model of sovereignty mentioned before.(241)  
In propounding this approach to sovereignty in Europe, we would retreat from the assumptions of 
post-sovereignty without giving in to the rigidity of the unitary approach or the false promises of 
pooled sovereignty. On this model, both national and European authorities retain their sovereignty 
but in having to be sovereign together, they cannot escape a certain degree of competition, emulation 
and cooperation which characterizes sovereignty in a pluralistic constitutional order, thus 
paradoxically fortifying rather than diminishing their individual sovereignties.(242) This conception 
of sovereignty corresponds to the close cooperation and prevention of conflicts among authorities 
that one may observe in practice and through which the European legal order was gradually 
constructed from ‘bottom up’ rather than ‘top-down’.(243) European law should therefore be 
understood as the product of discourse and cooperation among the actors of a broad European legal 
community which encompasses both the European legal community stricto sensu and national legal 
communities.(244) On this account, the exercize of sovereignty becomes reflexive and dynamic as it 
implies a search for the best allocation of power in each case, thus putting into question and 
potentially improving others’ exercize of sovereignty as well as one’s own. According to Walker’s 
similar conception of late sovereignty,  
‘The interrogative gaze of sovereign authorities may no longer be exclusively directed 
outwards towards competing or putative sovereign orders, but, in response to these 
competing claims, and also to the self-organising and self-regulatory claims of 
communities of practice and interest which do not define themselves as multi-functional 
polities, may also turn inwards.’ (245) 
4.4. The risks and advantages of cooperative sovereignty   
4.4.1. Erosion and duties of cooperative sovereignty  
Even though there are numerous advantages to defending this form of pluralist and cooperative 
sovereignty, risks of erosion of sovereignty through reflexivity and questioning should not be 
underestimated in the European Union. Besides the factual and sociological tendency one can 
observe towards sovereignty’s constructive development through pluralism and conflict(246), the 
risks of erosion may also be defeated by a normative argument. Cooperative sovereignty implies the 
emergence of mutual duties of adjustment and cooperation on the part of national and European 
judicial authorities active in the European legal order. As I have argued elsewhere, the dynamic and 
reflexive nature of cooperative sovereignty actually matches the existence of independent duties of 
coherence or integrity which go further than mere requirements of dialogue and mutual respect.(247)
According to the European integrity principle, all national and European authorities should make 
sure their decisions are consistent in principle with the past decisions of other European and national 
authorities which create and implement the law of a complex but single European legal order. 
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Only so can the European political and legal community gain true authority and legitimacy in the 
eyes of the European citizens to whom all these decisions apply. Miguel Poiares Maduro derives 
similar ‘harmonic principles of contrapunctual law’ from his conception of competitive sovereignty
(248) and argues that  
‘[European and national] authorities’ decisions should not be seen as separate 
interpretations and applications of European law, but as decisions to be integrated in a 
system of law requiring compatibility and coherence’.(249) 
These cooperative duties are necessary in a pluralist legal order; they are the limits to cooperative 
sovereignty necessary to ensure the cooperative nature of sovereignty or ‘the limits to pluralism 
necessary to allow the largest extent of pluralism possible(250)’. This implies that if either national 
or European authorities do not fulfil their obligations towards the others, the latter should be 
discharged from its reciprocal obligations.(251) This demonstrates how, as I have claimed 
elsewhere, coherence could become the virtue of Europeans’ integrated sovereignty, i.e. the virtue of 
a community which wants to integrate itself without, however, renouncing its diversity and hence its 
pluralism.(252) This idea is perfectly captured by Richard Bellamy’s account of mixed sovereignty:  
‘[…] unity is constructed via a dialogue amongst a plurality, with the one being 
continually challenged, renegotiated and reconstructed as the other evolves and becomes 
more diverse.’(253) 
It is important to understand that these duties of coherence and cooperation are duties of political 
morality rather than legal or institutionalized duties. Cooperative sovereignty captures a political 
reality in which distinct political and legal sovereigns overlap in the same community and territory, 
thus undermining the idea of a supreme and unifying legal framework of cooperation.(254) Contrary 
to what MacCormick argues when he opposes radical pluralism to his own soft or monist type of 
pluralism, however, this does not leave us with only plain politics and negotiation.(255) The 
commonality of population and territory implies, on the contrary, a joint moral responsibility on the 
part of all political and legal authorities.(256) And this responsibility encompasses cooperative 
duties of tolerance, dialogue and coherence among others.(257)  
4.4.2. Polity legitimacy and benefits of cooperative sovereignty   
Far from being a difficulty, potential sovereignty conflicts implied by the proposed conception of 
cooperative sovereignty could constitute an advantage in practice. This is because cooperative 
sovereignty provides the normative framework for the development of a dynamic and reflexive form 
of constitutionalism in Europe(258) and hence for the constitutional legitimation of the European 
polity.(259) Even if the framework of sovereignty does not exhaust the search for post-national 
political values and needs to be complemented by the promotion of constitutional values such as 
political discourse and citizenship in Europe, sovereignty anchors constitutional pluralism and is the 
inescapable precondition of post-national polity formation.(260) More precisely, the cooperative 
model of sovereignty presents three advantages for the emerging legitimacy of the European Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
20
4.4.2.1. Adjudication and taming constitutional conflicts  
Cooperative sovereignty constitutes an inspiring solution for all those who are concerned about the 
resolution of constitutional conflicts in Europe and the way the different jurisdictions control each 
other’s laws’ constitutionality.(261) Different ways to settle these conflicts have been brought 
forward over the past few years and they include dialogue(262) or international/supra-European 
modes of legal settlement.(263)  
Duties of cooperative sovereignty and in particular duties of coherence lead authorities beyond mere 
requirements of judicial dialogue and mutual respect(264) , towards a true European cooperative 
constitutional control.(265) It follows from what has been said about cooperative sovereignty in the 
European Union that constitutionality controls, either on the European or the national sides, should 
be seen as cooperative and reflexive.(266) Sovereignty qua question implies that sovereign 
authorities constantly reflect on the justification of their sovereignty by comparison to that of others 
over the same population and territory. National and European jurisdictions cannot afford to work 
separately and with no regard whatsoever for the other side’s constitutional rules.(267) As a 
consequence, in case of constitutional conflict, European and national authorities should question the 
grounds for their sovereignty on the issue at stake and be ready to contest them if required.  
According to this integrity-based model of constitutional control, adjudication in Europe could be 
much more respectful of other authorities’ laws and decisions and coherent than it is usually said to 
be. Most principles and values that are protected on each side are common to all European 
constitutional instruments and this even more so now that the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is about to become binding through entrenchment in the European Constitutional Treaty. 
Thus, disagreement about the best way to realize these common constitutional rights and principles 
enhances the need for cooperation and coherence in protecting them in each jurisdiction. This may 
be done mainly through a form of mutual interpretation and justification, whether this occurs through 
a preliminary ruling or not. This approach may actually be confirmed by the recent willingness to 
cooperate on the part of national courts and the ECJ.(268) In fact, the European Constitutional 
Treaty is about to reinforce and even extend this framework of cooperation among sovereign 
authorities by expressly stating the supremacy clause,(269) clarifying jurisdictional boundaries and 
enhancing human rights guarantees and democratic procedures.(270) Fewer constitutional conflicts 
should therefore arise in the future, and when they do, it will be on a more informed basis and they 
should hence become more constructive.  
Following the considerations I mentioned earlier about the moral and non-legal nature of cooperative 
duties, it should be clear why the proposed model of cooperative constitutional control is not to be 
translated legally or institutionalized in any way. Establishing rules of priority among European and 
national constitutional norms in case of conflict, along the lines proposed by Mattias Kumm and 
Victor Ferreres-Comella,(271) is a competence that cannot belong exclusively either to national 
constitutional law or to European constitutional law. Such rules would undermine the trust and 
responsibility that characterize the cooperative relationship between ultimate national and European 
authorities. Besides, it is an element inherent to what I referred to as the contestability of the 
sovereignty threshold that conflicts of sovereignty might occur on any matter of constitutional 
importance, thus excluding the possibility of determining those matters in advance or accordingly of 
fixing them in a common legal rule. As Maduro argues, it is important to leave the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz issue open in the joint and cooperative enterprise of European constitutionalism.(272)  
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4.4.2.2. Legislation and enhancing trans-European democratic standards  
Another key illustration of the significance of cooperative sovereignty for polity-legitimacy in 
Europe lies in the competition and cooperation that should prevail among democratic authorities.
(273) Since democratic rule is one of the values protected by sovereignty, the exercize of sovereignty 
qua question implies looking for the best level of decision to endow those affected by that decision 
with the strongest voice and hearing in Europe.(274)  
This is particularly important in the context of the ‘democratic deficit’ accusations. One of the 
central legitimacy deficits in the EU is said to be the democratic deficit due very schematically to the 
insufficient and at best distant connection between European decisions and popular participation. 
Rather than follow the misguided approach that aims at establishing state-like and centralized 
democracy at EU level,(275) potentially based on a unified and homogeneous demos, the democratic 
specificity of the European political arrangement should be seen to lie in the interaction and 
cooperation among national and European democratic institutions and hence among different demoi 
in Europe.(276) Instead of focusing only on the horizontal division of labour in European 
institutions, the democratic agenda should also be realized in the vertical division of competences in 
the European political community in general. European democracy can, in other words, be one of the 
outcomes of the cooperative and trans-European exercize of popular sovereignty.(277) A 
differentiated but cooperative exercize of national popular sovereignty might therefore lead to an 
increase in democratic legitimacy, both at the national and European levels.(278)  
Of course, more work remains to be done to ensure the cooperation among national and European 
democratic authorities in practice. One may mention the necessity to develop a trans-European 
public sphere and to stimulate trans-European political debates through the promotion of pan-
European political parties. An area where cooperative sovereignty could already be said to provide 
the means to develop a strong trans-European democracy is European inter-parliamentary 
cooperation. The importance of dialogue between parliaments throughout Europe has been 
emphasized a lot in recent years.(279) A Protocol to the Draft Constitutional Treaty actually 
establishes a series of measures to strengthen the involvement of national parliaments in EU 
decision-making which include, for instance, a duty to inform national parliaments, a common code 
of conduct and an early-warning mechanism in case of non-compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity. Besides the advantages of the creation of a European parliamentary public sphere,(280) 
one could argue that, once information has been exchanged, the legislative outcome, be it national or 
European, should be affected as a result of integrity duties and be required to speak with a Euro-
coherent voice.(281) The benefits of European inter-parliamentary cooperation could be measured in 
terms of both national and European democratic legitimacy. Transnational legislative dialogue and 
mutual comparison could add onto national standards of democratic legitimacy; they could 
contribute to enhancing the democratic quality of national legislation by introducing a form of 
double representation of the European demoi and hence of double check on national legislation. 
Moreover, national decisions in Europe are increasingly affected by European, but also by other 
national decisions in which they have no democratic representation.(282) The application of the 
principle of European integrity to the European Parliament could help alleviating the democratic 
deficit that plagues the European Parliament’s legislation.(283)  
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4.4.2.3. Constitutionalism and reinforcing European constitutional legitimacy  
Cooperative sovereignty reinforces European constitutionalism qua process,(284) i.e. the process of 
constitutionalization of the European Union which started fifty years ago and the outcome of which 
is currently being reorganized.(285) This process is a cross-disciplinary and cross-institutional one, 
as it implies different types of national and European authorities(286) in different legal fields that 
have a constitutional function in a broad sense of the term.(287) In these conditions, the duties of 
European cooperative sovereignty constitute a form of European constitutional discipline. All 
national and European authorities are reminded by their responsibilities of sovereignty that they are 
contributing to the gradual constitution or even to the re-constitution of Europe. They therefore have 
to test their decisions for coherence against other European and national constitutional standards 
before taking them.(288) This notion of competitive constitutionalism corresponds to Maduro’s 
conception of competitive sovereignty:  
‘On the one hand, European constitutionalism promotes inclusiveness in national 
constitutionalism both from an external and internal perspective. […] On the other hand, 
national constitutionalism also serves as a guarantee against the possible concentrations 
and abuses of power from European constitutionalism and, at the same time, requires the 
latter to constantly improve its constitutional standards in light of the challenges and 
requirements imposed on it by national constitutions.’(289)  
Of course, this form of constitutional discipline should not be interpreted as a way to disavow the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty, nor the outcomes of the 2004 IGC. It corresponds more closely, 
however, to the nature of the European community and the flexible way in which it has gradually 
constituted itself in fifty years of integration. The duties implied by cooperative sovereignty ensure a 
flexible and non-hierarchical cooperation between European constitutionalism and national 
constitutions.(290) In respecting duties of cooperative sovereignty, European constitutionalism qua 
process promotes the very ideals of respect and tolerance Joseph Weiler associates with the 
European constitution.(291) Despite its numerous other advantages,(292) a formal European 
Constitution should not disrupt this flexible and pluralist constitutional process and take the risk of 
replacing it with a rigid constitutional order. To prevent this, European institutions should actively 
foster the cooperative attitude and deliberation(293) among national and European constitutional 
authorities that was triggered by the European ‘constitutional moment’.(294)  
Conclusion  
Neither post-sovereignty, nor absolute and indivisible sovereignty in the Hobbesian sense, 
tomorrow’s sovereignty is both identical and different to yesterday’s. As it is the reasoned outcome 
of constant conflict and periodical changes of paradigms, sovereignty is neither the simple reflection 
of the new European and international reality nor the application of a pre-established concept whose 
criteria are immutable and risk corseting the post-national order. Both open and closed, the concept 
of sovereignty frames and stimulates debates that go deep into the heart of what should be the best 
allocation of power both in Europe and in the global order. As an essentially contestable concept, 
sovereignty is at once a state of affairs, a question pertaining to the nature and justification of that 
state of affairs and a justification of it. The correct use of the concept of sovereignty and hence the 
correct exercize of authority it implies consists therefore in constantly reflecting and contesting one’s 
use of the concept and hence one’s exercize of sovereignty.
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As such, the question-concept or reflexive concept of sovereignty can be described as cooperative in 
the post-national constellation where sovereign entities overlap in their claims to sovereignty over 
the same territory and population. Read together with the principle of subsidiarity, cooperative 
sovereignty implies allocating competences to those authorities that are best placed to ensure the 
protection of shared sovereign values and principles. Sovereignty’s use is both dynamic and 
reflexive and implies mutual learning and progress in the protection of the values it encompasses, 
such as the values of democracy and fundamental rights.  
In the European context, cooperative sovereignty provides the normative framework for the 
development of a dynamic and reflexive form of constitutionalism and hence of constitutional 
legitimation of the European polity. It reconciles national and European conflicting claims of 
sovereignty and the epistemological and normative resilience of sovereignty in the European Union, 
on the one hand, with constitutional pluralism and the coexistence of many different legal orders 
within the same territory and political community, on the other. Through its duties of cooperation 
and coherence, cooperative sovereignty countervails the risks of erosion implied by legal pluralism, 
while also enhancing the legitimacy of the European polity. This can be observed in the context of 
difficult issues such as adjudication and constitutional conflicts, legislation and democratic deficits 
and, finally, constitutionalism and the European constitutional moment. In a nutshell, cooperative 
sovereignty places conflicts of sovereignty at the centre of European politics, as both an incentive 
and a means of integration by way of comparison and self-reflexivity.  
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